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Primer
By Samantha Conway, David Diab, Amanda Fiorilla, &
Eric Grossfeld
I. The Inception of Public Corruption: Pre-McDonnell
A. The Mail Fraud Statute
When first enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute
prohibited the use of the mail in furtherance of “any scheme or
artifice to defraud.”1 The Supreme Court held in Durland v.
United States that the mail fraud statute must be read to include
“everything designed to defraud by representations as to the
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.”2
The Court rejected the argument raised by defense counsel,
claiming that the statute required some “misrepresentation as
to some existing fact,” rather than a “mere promise as to the
future.”3 The Court clarified that the statute was to be read
broadly in light of its ultimate purpose:
It was with the purpose of protecting the public
against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and
to prevent the post office from being used to carry
them into effect, that this statute was passed; and
it would strip it of value to confine it to such cases
as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some
existing fact, and exclude those in which is only
the allurement of a promise.4

1. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (1872) amended by Act
of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (1889).
2. 161 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1896). In Durland, the Defendant had used the
mails to sell bonds to members of the public which he had no intention of
honoring. Id.
3. Id. at 312.
4. Id. at 314.
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Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1909 in a
manner consistent with the Durland holding. The statute read
“any scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”5
B. The Intangible Rights Theory
This language was construed by each of the circuit courts of
appeal to include “schemes to defraud include[ing] those
designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government
of intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials
perform their duties honestly.”6 Therefore, depriving members
of the public of the right to honest services could form the basis
of a violation of the mail fraud statute, regardless of whether
there was a loss or deprivation of some tangible right.7
This right to honest services or intangible-rights theory, is
often credited to an opinion by the Fifth Circuit in Shushan v.
United States. In Shushan, a public official was charged and
convicted under the mail fraud statute for accepting a bribe in
exchange for a public contract, even though the contract was
mutually beneficial and involved no loss of any tangible property
on behalf of the city or general public.8 As an example of this
theory:
[I]f a city mayor (the offender) accepted a bribe
from a third party in exchange for awarding that
party a city contract, yet the contract terms were
the same as any that could have been negotiated
at arm’s length, the city (the betrayed party)
would suffer no tangible loss. . . . Even if the
scheme occasioned a money or property gain for
5. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (1889) amended by
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) (emphasis added).
6. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356-58 (1987).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975)
(mutually beneficial kick-back agreement with Secretary of State within the
scope of § 1341); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of
the mails to fraudulently write-in voter ballots within the scope of § 1341).
8. 117 F.2d 110, 115-19 (5th Cir. 1941).
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the betrayed party, courts reasoned, actionable
harm lay in the denial of that party’s right to the
offender’s “honest services.”9
In McNally v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected
such a broad interpretation, and construed the statute “as
limited in scope to the protection of property rights.”10 The Court
reasoned that such a result was necessary, as any alternative
would involve “constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves
its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials.”11
The decision “stopped the development of the intangiblerights doctrine in its tracks,” despite a vigorous dissent by
Justice Stevens.12 The court explained, “[i]f Congress desires to
go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.”13

9. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 363 (2010) (internal citations
omitted). “Unlike fraud in which the victim’s loss of money or property supplied
the defendant’s gain, with one the mirror image of the other . . .the honestservices theory targeted corruption that lacked similar symmetry.” Id. at 400
(internal citations omitted).
10. 483 U.S. at 360. In McNally, the prosecutor argued a state official’s
kickback scheme “defraud[ed] the citizens and government of Kentucky of their
right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly.” Id. at 353. The
Supreme Court held the jury instruction permitted a conviction under the mail
fraud statute for conduct not within the reach of § 1341, and therefore reversed
the conviction. Id.
11. Id. at 353.
12. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. at 362 (J., Stevens, dissenting). Justice Stevens cited to
several cases, including United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir.
1975), in which the Illinois Secretary of State accepted around $50,000 a year
to award contracts to a particular company. Although all the parties to the
agreement profited from the transaction, the Court of Appeals explained the
real victims were the people of Illinois and upheld the conviction. Justice
Stevens cautioned “these cases prove just how unwise today’s judicial
amendment of the mail fraud statute is.” Id. at 366-68.
13. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. at 360.
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C. The Honest-Services Statute
Congress responded a year later by enacting the honestservices statute.14 The honest-services statute defines the term
“scheme or artifice to defraud,” to include “a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services,” for
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(wire fraud). As interpreted by the Second Circuit:
The definite article ‘the’ suggests that ‘intangible
right of honest services’ had a specific meaning to
Congress when it enacted the statute—Congress
was recriminalizing mail- and wire-fraud
schemes to deprive others of that ’intangible right
of honest services,’ which had been protected
before McNally, not all intangible rights of honest
services whatever they might be thought to be.15
In Skilling v. United States, the defense urged the Court to
hold the honest-services statute unconstitutional as
impermissibly vague.16 Although acknowledging Skilling’s
vagueness challenge carried some weight, the court declined to
overturn the statute and opted for a limited construction:
Although some applications of the pre-McNally
honest-services doctrine occasioned disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals, these cases do not
cloud the doctrine’s solid core: The “vast majority”
of the honest-services cases involved offenders
who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated
in bribery or kickback schemes.17

14. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. “There is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to
refer to and incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Courts of
Appeals’ decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of
fraud.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010).
15. Id. at 404-05 (citing United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 137-38
(2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 407-08.
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The Court reasoned that “Congress intended § 1346 to reach
at least bribes and kickbacks,” and “[t]o preserve the statute
without transgressing constitutional limitations, we now hold
that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the
pre-McNally case law.18
Notably, the Government had argued that the honestservices provision encompassed other proscribed conduct,
specifically “undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or
private employee -i.e., the taking of official action by the
employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial interests
while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes
a fiduciary duty.”19
The Court declined to extend its interpretation of the
honest-services to provision to encompass the “mere failure” to
disclose conflict-of-interests. The Court stated that such conduct
fell outside the “core application” of the honest-services doctrine
that had developed pre-McNally. The court continued:
Although the Courts of Appeals upheld honestservices convictions for “some schemes of nondisclosure
and concealment of material
information,” . . . they reached no consensus on
which schemes qualified. In light of the relative
infrequency of conflict-of-interest prosecutions in
comparison to bribery and kickback charges, and
the intercircuit inconsistencies they produced, we
conclude that a reasonable limiting construction
of § 1346 must exclude this amorphous category
of cases.20
The government had claimed that Skilling conspired to
defraud the shareholders of Enron Corporation by
misrepresenting the company’s financial growth, which had
inflated the company’s stock prices. The Government argued
that through the fraudulent scheme, Skilling profited

18. Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added).
19. Brief for United States at 43-44, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S.
at 409.
20. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410-11 (internal citations omitted).
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approximately $89 million.
However, the government did not allege that Skilling had
either solicited or accepted “side payments from a third party in
exchange for making these representations.” In the absence of
such conduct, the Court held “[i]t is therefore clear that, as we
read § 1346, Skilling did not commit honest-services fraud.”21
Justice Scalia, concurring with the majority in its opinion
and judgment, noted the inconsistency between the
congressional intent behind the honest-services provision and
the Court’s limited construction:
To say that bribery and kickbacks represented
“the core” of the doctrine, or that most cases
applying the doctrine involved those offenses, is
not to say that they are the doctrine. All it proves
is that the multifarious versions of the
doctrine overlap with regard to those offenses.
But the doctrine itself is much more. Among all
the
pre-McNally smorgasbord
offerings of
varieties of honest-services fraud, not one is
limited to bribery and kickbacks. That is a dish
the Court has cooked up all on its own.
Thus, the Court’s claim to “respec[t] the
legislature,” is false. It is entirely clear (as the
Court and I agree) that Congress meant to
reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services
law; and entirely clear that that prohibited much
more (though precisely what more is uncertain)
than bribery and kickbacks. Perhaps it is true
that “Congress intended § 1346 to reach at
least bribes and kickbacks[.] “That simply does
not mean, as the Court now holds, that”
§ 1346 criminalizes only” bribery and kickbacks.22
21. Id. at 413. In Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 471 (2010), in
reliance on the Skilling opinion issued the same day, the court vacated a
conviction because the jury instructions improperly defined what conduct fell
within the scope of the honest services statute.
22. Id. at 421-22 (J., Scalia concurring). Notably, Scalia later clarified his
disdain for the Skilling opinion. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 34
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II. Continued Implications: Beyond Mail Fraud
The Supreme Court has confirmed the limitation placed on
the previously coined “honest services” theory, as codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1346. In Sekar v. United States, the New York State
Comptroller was responsible for issuing a Commitment
regarding potential investments of New York’s Common
Retirement Fund.23 The General Counsel of the Comptroller’s
office had considered investing in FA Technology Ventures, but
ultimately wrote a recommendation not to invest in the fund.
Sekar sent various anonymous emails demanding that the
general counsel move forward with the investment, and
threatened to disclose an extra-marital affair if he failed to do
so.24 Sekar was indicted and convicted of attempted extortion
under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).25
The jury was specifically charged, and ultimately based its
verdict, on finding Sekar had attempted to extort “the General
Counsel’s recommendation to approve the Commitment.”26
Under the Hobbs Act, a conviction for extortion required “the
obtaining of property from another.”27 The Second Circuit held
that the General Counsel “had a property right in rendering
sound legal advice to the Comptroller and, specifically, to
recommend—free from threats—whether the Comptroller
should issue a Commitment.”28
The Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation, relying
on its earlier decision in Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., which held that
extortion required depriving “something of value” that the
person could “exercise, transfer, or sell.”29 The Court continued:

(2011) (“We have, I recognize, upheld hopelessly vague criminal statutes in the
past – indeed, in the recent past. That is regrettable.” (citing Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010)).
23. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 731 (2013).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 730-32.
26. Id. at 732.
27. Id. at 731
28. Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436, 441 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
29. Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003).
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The principle announced [in Scheidler]—that a
defendant must pursue something of value from
the victim that can be exercised, transferred, or
sold—applies with equal force here. Whether one
considers the personal right at issue to be
“property” in a broad sense or not, it certainly was
not obtainable property under the Hobbs Act.30
Specifically, the Court noted “[a]dopting the Government’s
theory here would not only make nonsense of words; it would
collapse the longstanding distinction between extortion and
coercion and ignore Congress’s choice to penalize one but not the
other.”31 Therefore, outside the context of bribery and kickback
schemes, the Supreme Court has continued to apply a strict
tangible “property rights” theory.
However, Justice Scalia’s caution in Skilling v. United
States concerned more than which specific offenses fell within
the scope of the honest services provision:
The pre-McNally cases provide no clear indication
of what constitutes a denial of the right of honest
services. The possibilities range from any action
that is contrary to public policy or otherwise
immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official
or employee to his principal, to only the secret use
of a perpetrator’s position of trust in order to harm
whomever he is beholden to.32
Even accepting as true that the “core” offenses covered by
the honest-services provision consisted of only bribery and
kickbacks, Justice Scalia believed the inherent vagueness of the
statute would persist: “[E]ven with the bribery and kickback
limitation the statute does not answer the question, ‘What is the
criterion of guilt?’”33

30.
31.
32.
33.

Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 736-37 (emphasis added).
Id. at 738.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 420 (2010).
Id. at 421.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/2

8

(688-706) PRIMER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

696

9/18/18 8:50 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38:3

III. The Build-Up to McDonnell
Although the issue arose in the context of the mail fraud
statute, the inherent vagueness and lack of clear outerboundaries would continue to plague the court for years to come
in the context of public corruption. Ultimately, the question
remains unanswered: when does a public official cross the line
from lawful to culpable conduct?
The Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in 1991. In
McCormick v. United States, McCormick was a member of the
house of delegates and was working with a lobbyist interested in
extending a license that allowed foreign medical school
graduates to practice in the state before passing the state
licensing exam.34 McCormick had expressed to the lobbyist that
he paid out-of-pocket for a large part of his campaign, and
thereafter accepted cash payments of $900 and $2,000 dollars
from various foreign doctors, which he failed to report as
campaign contributions or on his federal tax return. He then
sponsored a bill to extend the license regarding foreign medical
school graduates and spoke at length about the bills benefits,
which was ultimately passed into law. He was later indicted by
a federal grand jury for five counts of violating the Hobbs Act,
including extortion under color of official right.
18 U.S.C § 1951 (commonly known as the “Hobbs Act”)
prohibits any person who
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article of
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or
threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section.35
Extortion is defined to mean “the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
34. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1991).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
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right[.]”36
The jury was instructed on extortion as follows:
Extortion under color of official right means the
obtaining of money by a public official when the
money obtained was not lawfully due and owing
to him or to his office. Of course, extortion does not
occur where one who is a public official receives a
legitimate gift or a voluntary political
contribution
even
though
the
political
contribution may have been made in cash in
violation of local law. Voluntary is that which is
freely given without expectation of benefit.37
McCormick was convicted of one, but not all, of the Hobbs
Act extortion charges. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that
proof of a quid pro quo was not required in all circumstances,
specifically where it is shown that the parties never intended the
payment as a legitimate campaign contribution in the first
place.38 Although the Supreme Court limited its holding to
payments made to elected officials in the context of campaign
contributions, the Court clarified:
Political contributions are of course vulnerable if
induced by the use of force, violence, or fear. The
receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable
under the Act as having been taken under color of
official right, but only if the payments are made in
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by
the official to perform or not to perform an official
act. In such situations the official asserts that his
official conduct will be controlled by the terms of
the promise or undertaking. This is the receipt of
money by an elected official under color of official
right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.39
36.
37.
38.
39.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 264-65.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
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A year later, the Supreme Court addressed the question
outside the context of campaign contributions in Evans v. United
States.40 Evans was elected to the Board of Commissioners of a
county in Georgia.41 After assuming office, he was contacted by
an FBI agent posing as a real estate developer attempting to rezone a tract of land. After several conversations, all initiated by
the FBI agent, Evans accepted $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 check
payable to his campaign. He did not report the cash on his
campaign-financing disclosure form or federal income tax
return.42 Evans was later indicted and convicted of extortion
under the Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
On appeal, the main issue before the Court was “whether an
affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a
demand, is an element of the offense of extortion ‘under color of
official right[.]’”
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the jury was not required
to find that petitioner had demanded or requested the money, or
that he had “conditioned the performance of an official act upon
payment of money.”43 Rather, the Court held:
[P]assive acceptance of a benefit by a public
official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs
Act violation if the official knows that he is being
offered the payment in exchange for a specific
requested exercise of his official power. The
official need not take any specific action to induce
the offering of the benefit.44
On certiorari, the Supreme Court endorsed the position of
the Eleventh Circuit, noting that eight other circuits had
reached similar holdings. Two Circuits required “an affirmative
act or inducement by the public official” to support an extortion
conviction under the Hobbs Act, which the Supreme Court
declined to follow.45 The Court reasoned:
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 796 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 796.
Id. (citing United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1984)

11

(688-706) PRIMER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

9/18/18 8:50 PM

PRIMER

699

First, we think the word “induced” is a part of the
definition of the offense by the private individual,
but not the offense by the public official. In the
case of the private individual, the victim’s consent
must be “induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence or fear.” In the case of
the public official, however, there is no such
requirement. The statute merely requires of the
public official that he obtain “property from
another, with his consent, . . . under color of
official right.” The use of the word “or” before”
under color of official right” supports this reading.
Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the
word “induced” applied to the public officeholder,
we do not believe the word “induced” necessarily
indicates that the transaction must be initiated by
the recipient of the bribe. Many of the cases
applying the majority rule have concluded that
the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all
the inducement that the statute requires. They
conclude that the coercive element is provided by
the public office itself.46
Evans also argued that to support a charge of extortion
“under color of official right” there must be an “affirmative step”
on behalf of the public official, and that such requirement must
be reflected in the jury instructions. The Court rejected his
argument, holding “the Government need only show that a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for
official acts.”47

(en banc) (“Although receipt of benefits by a public official is a necessary
element of the crime, there must also be proof that the public official did
something, under color of his public office, to cause the giving of
benefits.”)); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (“We find ourselves in accord with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that
inducement is an element required for conviction under the Hobbs Act.”)).
46. Evans, 504 U.S. at 265-66.
47. Id. at 268.
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In 1999, the Court confronted the need to provide a clear
definition of “official act” in the context of the federal bribery and
illegal gratuities provisions:
Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official
act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while
illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be
given or accepted “for or because of” an official act.
In other words, for bribery there must be a quid
pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act.
An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may
constitute merely a reward for some future act
that the public official will take (and may already
have determined to take), or for a past act that he
has already taken.48
The District Court’s instructions in this case, in
differentiating between a bribe and an illegal gratuity, correctly
noted that only a bribe requires proof of a quid pro quo. The
point in controversy here is that the instructions went on to
suggest that § 201(c)(1)(A), unlike the bribery statute, did not
require any connection between respondent’s intent and a
specific official act.49 Rather, the court held the Government is
required to prove “a link between a thing of value conferred upon
a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which
it was given.”50
IV. The McDonnell Decision
Former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell was charged and
convicted of eleven counts of bribery-related charges after
receiving over $175,000 in gifts and loans from Jonnie Williams,
Sr., in exchange for the former governor’s assistance in making
profitable a dietary supplement sold by Mr. Williams.51 The
48.
49.
50.
51.

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999).
Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
Id. at 414.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); see also Tara
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charges included conspiracy to attempt honest-services wire
fraud, committing honest-services wire fraud, and extortion
under the Hobbs Act by obtaining property under color of official
right under U.S.C. § 1951. The underlying theory of the charges
was that McDonnell accepted bribes from Williams.52
The parties had conceded that knowledge that the “thing of
value” was obtained “in return for official action” was a
requirement of the Hobbs Act extortion charge. Therefore, “the
Government was required to prove that Governor McDonnell
committed or agreed to commit an ‘official act’ in exchange for
the loans and gifts from Williams.”53 The Government alleged
that the following qualified as official acts:
(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with
Virginia government officials, who were
subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and
promote Anatabloc;
(2) hosting, and . . . attending, events at the
Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage
Virginia university researchers to initiate studies
of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific’s
products to doctors for referral to their patients;
(3) contacting other government officials in the
[Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to
encourage Virginia state research universities to
initiate studies of anatabine;
(4) promoting Star Scientific’s products and
facilitating its relationships with Virginia
government officials by allowing [Williams] to
invite individuals important to Star Scientific’s
business to exclusive events at the Governor’s
Malloy, Symposium: Is it bribery or “the basic compact underlying
representative government?”, (July 28, 2016 4:03 PM) SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-is-it-bribery-or-the-basiccompact-underlying-representative-government/.
52. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366.
53. Id. at 2365.
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Mansion; and
(5) recommending that senior government
officials in the [Governor’s Office] meet with Star
Scientific executives to discuss ways that the
company’s products could lower healthcare
costs.54
A unanimous Supreme Court overturned McDonnell’s
conviction holding the district court erred by improperly
instructing the jury on the definition of “official act” to
encompass setting up meetings or other related conduct, without
more.
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) defines “official act” as “any decision or
action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may
by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”55
The Court chose to adopt a “bounded interpretation” of “official
act.” The Court explained there are two requirements for
conduct to fall within the scope of an “official act,” pursuant
§ 201(a)(3):
First, the Government must identify a “question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy”
that “may at any time be pending” or “may by law
be brought” before a public official. Second, the
Government must prove that the public official
made a decision or took an action “on” that
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
controversy, or agreed to do so.56
The Court explained the terminology “may by law” connotes
“something within the specific duties of an official’s position —
the function conferred by the authority of his office.”57
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2365-66.
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2358.
Id. at 2369.
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Additionally, the Court clarified that, “[t]he word ‘any’ conveys
that the matter may be pending either before the public official
who is performing the official act, or before another public
official.”58
Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected that “[s]etting up
a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or
agreeing to do so)” would not fall within the scope of an official
“something
more
is
act,
without
more.59 Rather,
required: §201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make
a decision or take an action on that question or matter, or agree
to do so.”60 The court listed several examples:
[A] decision or action to initiate a research study
— or a decision or action on a qualifying step, such
as narrowing down the list of potential research
topics — would qualify as an “official act.” A public
official may also make a decision or take an action
on a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy” by using his official position to exert
pressure on another official to perform an “official
act.” In addition, if a public official uses his official
position to provide advice to another official,
knowing or intending that such advice will form
the basis for an “official act” by another official,
that too can qualify as a decision or action for
purposes of §201(a)(3).61
The Court did add that ultimately acting upon a promise to
act is not necessary, nor does a public official need to explain the
means of accomplishing how he will fulfill said promise as part
of the bargain.
The court explained that a limiting
interpretation was necessary, otherwise any decision or action
by a public official could potentially fall within the scope of the
statutory prohibition.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2358.
Id. at 2372.
Id. at 2370.
Id.
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V. Post-McDonnell: Lasting Implications
Since McDonnell, even though the statute has not changed,
the standard has. McDonnell has broadened what falls within
the scope of “routine political favors” and clarified that such
conduct will not, in and of itself, constitute public corruption.
In response to the McDonnell scandal, the Virginia
legislature passed a law limiting the value of gifts that the
Governor and members of the Virginia General Assembly may
receive to $100.62 Therefore, although the former-governor’s
conduct would not constitute an “official act” under federal law,
Virginia state law would prohibit similar conduct moving
forward.
One scholar has noted that courts may apply the narrow
definition to all of the public corruption statutes. Will courts
apply the narrow definition to all similarly-phrased statutory
provisions, or only to those similar to McDonnell?63 In the
Second Circuit, convictions have been vacated because the jury
instructions did not comply with the Supreme Court’s narrow
interpretation of official act.64

62. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3103.1 (West 2015). Campaign contributions are
excluded from the coverage of the statute. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3101.
63. Adam F. Minchew, Note, Who Put The Quo In Quid Pro Quo?: Why
Courts Should Apply McDonnell’s “Official Act” Definition Narrowly, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1793 (2017).
64. See generally United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Skelos,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18525 (2d Cir. 2017). See also Eugene Temchenko, Note,
A First Amendment Right To Corrupt Your Politician, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
465, 490-91, 495 (2018) (“McDonnell changed things. On July 13, 2017, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of New York
State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, citing McDonnell v. United States.
The prosecution charged Silver with many corrupt schemes. For example,
Silver allegedly funneled $500,000 in taxpayer-funded research grants to a
doctor in exchange for the doctor steering his patients to Silver’s law firm.
Silver also met with lobbyists, hosted parties and voted for legislation that
benefited real estate developers, allegedly in exchange for the developers’ use
of a law firm that paid Silver referral fees. Despite finding ample evidence, the
Court of Appeals reversed Silver’s conviction and remanded for a new trial,
holding that the jury instruction ‘captured lawful conduct, such as arranging
meetings or hosting events with constituents.’ The jury instructions were
overbroad because, post McDonnell, the instructions captured examples of
lawful influence peddling.”).
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VI. Opinions & Views
•

•

•

Jessica Tillipman, an Assistant Dean at George Washington
University Law School, stated: “It just raises the standard
of prosecution to a very, very high level. I think it’s going
to make it a lot easier for politicians to accept gifts and
hospitality and payments in return for taking action.”65
Stephen Farnsworth, a political scientist at the University
of Mary Washington in Virginia, stated: “The Supreme
Court decision really gives a green light to elected officials
to solicit whatever goodies they may wish, as long as
they’re not clear about doing anything in return.”66
Randall Eliason, a former federal prosecutor commented:
“The Supreme Court has actually opened the door for
public officials to charge businesspeople and the like for
access to political-natured meetings. He outlined a
scenario, which he said would now be legal, in which a
governor could accept money in exchange for arranging a
business owner to meet with public officials, specifically
stipulating that they won’t influence the outcome.”67
The first policy reason Chief Justice Roberts
offered in support of the McDonnell decision is
that broad application of bribery statutes could
deter officials from “respond[ing] to even the most
commonplace requests for assistance,” and
citizens “from participating in democratic
discourse.” This formulation raises the question of
why broad application of a bribery statute, or any
other anti-corruption statute, would deter citizens
from democratic discourse. That is, if the citizen
were merely speaking, there would be no grounds

65. Matt Zapotosky, In McDonnell case, Supreme Court makes it harder
to prosecute corruption, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 27, 2016) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-mcdonnell-case-supreme
-court-makes-it-harder-to-prosecute-corruption/2016/06/27/dedf4baa-3c81-11e
6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.782691d5b391.
66. Alan Greenblatt, In Wake of McDonnell Ruling, What Counts as
Corruption?, GOVERNING (June 29, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/
politics/gov-scotus-mcdonnell-virginia-corruption.html.
67. Id.
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for finding corruption—no quid. Chief Justice
Roberts’s formulation only makes sense if the
citizen engages in democratic discourse with
money or other consideration, as in Citizens
United. Similarly, anti-corruption statutes would
rarely apply to an official’s response to a
constituent’s request for assistance. For example,
no one would suspect corruption if a senator were
to advocate a bill to assist victims of a natural
disaster. Common sense dictates that official acts
that benefit the public in general would make for
poor prosecutions. Anticorruption statutes are
only relevant, therefore, when a public official
shows undue favor to an individual or a select
group of individuals in exchange for some benefit.
Thus explained, the Chief Justice appears
concerned that broad bribery statutes would deter
citizens from contributing funds in exchange for
special treatment. In fact, the Chief Justice labels
such exchanges as “participat[ion] in democratic
discourse” rather than corruption. Accordingly,
Chief Justice Roberts’s public policy concern is
congruent
with
Citizens
United’s
First
Amendment concern. As in Citizens United, the
McDonnell Court asserts that “[i]ngratiation and
access . . . are not corruption.”68

68. Temchenko, supra note 64, at 490-91 (internal citations omitted).
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